

1 **HVAC filtration for controlling infectious airborne disease transmission in indoor
2 environments: Predicting risk reductions and operational costs**

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1 Abstract

2 This work describes and applies a methodology for estimating the impact of recirculating
3 heating, ventilating, and air-conditioning (HVAC) particle filters on the control of size-resolved
4 infectious aerosols in indoor environments using a modified version of the Wells-Riley model
5 for predicting risks of infectious disease transmission. Estimates of risk reductions and
6 associated operational costs of both HVAC filtration and equivalent outdoor air ventilation are
7 modeled and compared using a case study of airborne transmission of influenza in a hypothetical
8 office space. Overall, recirculating HVAC filtration was predicted to achieve risk reductions at
9 lower costs of operation than equivalent levels of outdoor air ventilation, particularly for MERV
10 13-16 filters. Medium efficiency filtration products (MERV 7-11) are also inexpensive to operate
11 but appear less effective in reducing infectious disease risks.

12 1. Introduction

13 The airborne transmission of respiratory pathogens such as measles, tuberculosis, severe
14 acute respiratory syndrome (SARS), influenza, rhinovirus, and others in indoor environments
15 and the associated risk of infection presented to uninfected occupants are governed by several
16 complex physical and biological processes. Communicable respiratory illnesses lead to large
17 excesses in expenses associated with healthcare, absence from work, and lost worker
18 productivity [1], but the control of airborne infectious disease transmission in indoor
19 environments is not yet entirely understood [2]. Several studies have shown that building design
20 and operational characteristics such as increased outdoor air ventilation rates, lower occupant
21 density, and use of UV germicidal irradiation can reduce the risk of infectious disease
22 transmission inside buildings [3–7]. Similarly, commonly available particle filters in
23 recirculating heating, ventilating, and air-conditioning (HVAC) systems may also be used to

1 reduce the risk of airborne infectious disease transmission, depending on the nature of infectious
2 aerosols and some important building characteristics [2,4,8–12].

3 However, key questions remain about (i) the effectiveness of particle filtration for
4 controlling airborne infectious aerosols, (ii) the associated risk reductions achievable with
5 HVAC filtration, and (iii) the relative costs of risk reduction by HVAC filtration versus other
6 control mechanisms such as increased outdoor air ventilation rates. To address these questions,
7 this article describes and applies a methodology for estimating the impact of recirculating HVAC
8 filters on the control of size-resolved infectious aerosols in indoor environments using a
9 modified version of the Wells-Riley model for predicting risks of airborne infectious disease
10 transmission. Estimates of likely risk reductions and associated operational costs of both HVAC
11 filtration and equivalent outdoor air ventilation are modeled and compared using a case study of
12 airborne transmission of influenza in a hypothetical office space in multiple climates.

13 **2. Background**

14 **2.1 Estimating risks of airborne disease transmission**

15 Aerosol transmission has been shown to be a predominant route of transmission for a
16 number of communicable diseases, including rhinovirus [7,13], influenza [14–16], tuberculosis
17 [17], and SARS [18]. There is also growing empirical evidence that increased outdoor air
18 ventilation rates in buildings can reduce the transmission of some of these same diseases [19],
19 which further confirms the likely importance of airborne transmission via infectious aerosols in
20 indoor environments. One often-used approach to estimating the risks associated with airborne
21 transmission of respiratory diseases is the Wells-Riley model, as shown in Equation 1 [20].

$$P_{\text{infection}} = \frac{\text{cases}}{\text{susceptiles}} = 1 - e^{-\frac{I_{qpt}}{Q_{oa}}} \quad (1)$$

1 where $P_{\text{infection}}$ = the probability of infection; *cases* = the number of infection cases; *susceptibles* =
 2 number of susceptible individuals; *I* = number of infector individuals; *p* = pulmonary ventilation
 3 rate of a person (m^3/hour); *q* = quanta generation rate (1/hr); *t* = exposure time (hr); and Q_{oa} =
 4 room ventilation rate with infection-free air (m^3/hour).

5 The Wells-Riley model is based on a concept of “quantum of infection,” whereby the rate
 6 of generation of infectious airborne particles (or *quanta*) can be used to model the likelihood of
 7 an individual in a steady-state well-mixed indoor environment being exposed to the infectious
 8 particles and subsequently succumbing to infection. Note that some researchers have also
 9 expanded this model to include time-varying exposures [21] and others have developed zonal
 10 versions that account for incomplete mixing in an indoor environment [22].

11 The quantum of infection term (*q*) in this risk model is not an actual physical unit; it is a
 12 hypothetical infectious dose unit that is typically back calculated from observational
 13 epidemiological studies. Conceptually, it describes the number of infectious particles in a way
 14 that implicitly accounts for both the amount of particles generated over time and the infectivity
 15 of particles, which also inherently captures susceptibility of individuals and particle size effects
 16 such as the probability of deposition in appropriate regions of the respiratory system. Because of
 17 the empirical nature of the model in Equation 1, existing literature on quanta generation rates (*q*)
 18 is relatively limited. Published ranges of *q* for several infectious airborne diseases are shown in
 19 Table 1.

20 **Table 1. Summary of quanta generation rates reported in existing literature**

Infectious disease	Reported values of quanta generation rates (<i>q</i>)	Reference(s)
Rhinovirus (common cold)	~1-10 per hour	[23]
Tuberculosis	~1-50 per hour	[17,24–26]
SARS	~10-300 per hour	[27,28]
Influenza	~15-500 per hour	[23,24,28,29]
Measles	~570-5600 per hour	[20]

1 It is also important to note the assumption of well-mixed indoor environments in this
2 model and in previous derivations of quanta generation rates. Because of this assumption, the
3 model cannot distinguish between long-range transport of smaller infectious aerosols (i.e.,
4 droplet nuclei) and close-contact airborne spread of infectious diseases that occurs when expelled
5 infectious aerosols deposit directly on susceptible parts of the human body (i.e., large droplet).
6 However, quanta generation rates are usually back calculated from scenarios where long-range
7 transport was very likely a major factor. For example, Rudnick and Milton (2003) estimated
8 quanta generation rates of 15-128 per hour for influenza (depending on steady-state or dynamic
9 assumptions) using data from a grounded passenger airplane where the majority of passengers
10 throughout the airplane acquired the influenza virus from one infected individual [23]. While the
11 quanta generation rates in this case may have accounted for some close-range transport, it is
12 reasonable to assume that many passengers would also have been infected by longer-range
13 aerosol transport.

14 Despite some of these limitations, the Wells-Riley model has been used previously to
15 show that some building factors, particularly outdoor air ventilation rates, can be an important
16 removal mechanism for airborne infectious agents [17,30,31]. Because the removal mechanisms
17 of any aerosol (including HVAC filtration) are primarily functions of particle size [32,33], it is
18 important to consider the actual particle size distributions of infectious aerosols in indoor
19 environments for use with this model. Although the original Wells-Riley model does not
20 explicitly account for the size-resolved nature of infectious aerosols, modifications have been
21 made by others to do so [4,34,35]. Therefore, the next sections describe previous efforts to
22 integrate other size-dependent loss terms into the Wells-Riley equation and then review existing
23 knowledge of particle size distributions of infectious aerosols to inform the modeling effort

1 herein. Infectious particle size distributions are explored with the specific intent of generalizing
 2 for use with the particle size range relevant to a common HVAC filtration standard: ASHRAE
 3 Standard 52.2 [36].

4 **2.2 Incorporating size-dependent loss terms into the Wells-Riley equation**

5 From a mass balance perspective, HVAC filtration and other removal mechanisms are
 6 treated similarly to outdoor air ventilation because they both can be used to reduce indoor
 7 concentrations of airborne infectious particles. In fact, the steady-state Wells-Riley equation has
 8 previously been modified in other investigations to include additional removal terms other than
 9 outdoor air ventilation, including filtration by personal respirators, UV degradation, particle
 10 deposition, and HVAC particle filtration [3,4,10,31]. Equation 2 follows the same procedures by
 11 including both HVAC filtration and deposition loss terms.

$$P_{\text{infection}} = 1 - \exp \left[\frac{Iqpt}{V} / (\lambda_{\text{ventilation}} + k_{\text{filtration}} + k_{\text{deposition}}) \right] \quad (2)$$

12 where V = indoor air volume (m^3); $\lambda_{\text{ventilation}}$ = clean air ventilation rate (Q_{oa}/V , 1/hr); $k_{\text{filtration}}$ =
 13 infectious particle removal rate due to filtration (1/hr); and $k_{\text{deposition}}$ = infectious particle
 14 deposition rate (1/hr). Deposition removal rates ($k_{\text{deposition}}$) depend primarily on particle size,
 15 density, and room characteristics such as airspeeds and surface areas [35,37]. Filtration removal
 16 rates ($k_{\text{filtration}}$) depend on the rate of airflow through the HVAC filter (Q_{filter}), the fractional
 17 operation time of the HVAC system (f_{HVAC}), and the size-resolved infectious particle removal
 18 efficiency of the filter or air-cleaning device installed (η_{filter}) as shown in Equation 3. The airflow
 19 rate through the filter divided by the volume of the indoor air space served and multiplied by
 20 fractional operation time is also called the recirculation rate ($\lambda_{\text{recirculated}}$).

$$k_{\text{filtration}} = f_{\text{HVAC}} \frac{Q_{\text{filter}} \eta_{\text{filter}}}{V} = \lambda_{\text{recirculated}} \eta_{\text{filter}} \quad (3)$$

21

1 where f_{HVAC} = fractional HVAC operation time (-); Q_{filter} = airflow rate through filter (m^3/hr);
2 η_{filter} = particle removal efficiency of the filter (-); and $\lambda_{\text{recirculated}}$ = recirculation rate through the
3 HVAC filter (1/hr). Depending on the nature of the virus or bacteria of concern inside of
4 expelled droplets or droplet nuclei, some rate of inactivation may also occur as aerosols are
5 exposed to indoor air [34]. This rate has been explored for some viruses [38,39] and is dependent
6 in part on environmental conditions such as relative humidity. However, we have excluded this
7 loss rate in this work in part because of a lack of existing data on size-resolved inactivation rates
8 for multiple infectious aerosols of concern and in part because quanta generation rates, when
9 back calculated using Equation 1, should inherently account for any inactivation that occurred
10 during the case study period. Additionally, although Equations 2 and 3 are shown without
11 explicitly considering particle size effects, both the filtration and deposition loss parameters
12 ($k_{\text{deposition}}$ and $k_{\text{filtration}}$) are size-dependent. Therefore, the following sections describe existing
13 knowledge of the particle size distributions of infectious aerosols.

14 **2.3 Particle size distributions of infectious aerosols**

15 When an individual coughs, sneezes, speaks, or breathes, *droplets* consisting of liquid
16 water, proteins, salts, and various other organic and inorganic matter are expelled into the air. If
17 the emitter is infected with a particular respiratory infection, those droplets may also contain
18 smaller infectious particles themselves, which may be viruses or bacteria depending on the type
19 of infection. Viruses are typically an order of magnitude or more smaller in size than bacteria:
20 ~20-200 nm for viruses vs. ~0.2-5 μm for most bacteria [40]. In other explorations of the impacts
21 of particle filtration and other size-dependent processes on virus and bacteria disease
22 transmission, some researchers have assumed that the individual virus or bacteria particles are
23 aerosolized and exist suspended as individual organisms [11,41]; however, it is likely more

1 appropriate to consider the particles as larger expelled droplets that contain aggregates of the
2 smaller infectious particles within [8,35,42,43].

3 Once expelled from a high relative humidity environment (the human body) to a
4 relatively less humid environment (most indoor environments), droplets rapidly decrease in size
5 as the surrounding liquid evaporates. Several studies have shown that this liquid evaporation
6 typically occurs within less than one second of emission for particles smaller than ~50 µm in
7 diameter [44]. After rapid evaporation, *droplet nuclei* containing the mix of solid particles
8 (including any infectious particles) remain. Droplet nuclei typically have particle diameters that
9 are 40-50% of the original droplet size [35,39].

10 It is commonly believed that droplet nuclei particles average 1 to 3 µm in diameter [42],
11 although several recent studies have shown considerable variation in the size distribution of
12 expelled droplets and droplet nuclei. Nicas et al. [35] summarized nearly 50 years of
13 measurements of particle size distributions of droplets emitted by humans during coughing and
14 sneezing and reported that cough-generated aerosols could be divided into two lognormally
15 distributed modes: (i) a small particle size distribution with a geometric mean diameter of ~10
16 µm (ii) a large particle size distribution with a geometric mean diameter of ~160 µm. However,
17 the smaller particle size distribution was found to contain the majority of cough particles
18 (~70%). Given that the same authors described some evidence of smaller particles being more
19 infectious than larger particles, it appears that smaller (i.e., < 10 µm) particles are likely of
20 greatest concern for droplet nuclei transmission of infectious diseases. Several more recent
21 studies utilizing more advanced measurement techniques have revealed a general consensus that
22 the majority (often 80-90%) of particles expelled during various human activities are actually

1 smaller than 1-2 μm in diameter [45–50], although it is not clear whether actual virus content
 2 scales more with particle number, surface area, or volume distributions.

3 **2.4 Infectious particles within droplet nuclei**

4 While previous studies have been helpful for identifying the size of particles expelled
 5 during human activities, several more recent studies have utilized more sophisticated techniques
 6 (e.g., quantitative polymerase chain reaction, or q-PCR) to identify the presence of viruses or
 7 bacteria in expelled droplets and droplet nuclei collected on multi-stage bioaerosol samplers
 8 [46,51–55]. These studies offer insight not only into what size aerosols exist after expulsion from
 9 the human body, but in what size-fractions are viruses or bacteria actually present and are thus of
 10 most concern for infectious disease transmission. Several of these recent studies have focused on
 11 the particle size distributions of influenza in indoor and personal airborne particulate matter in
 12 indoor environments, as summarized in Table 2.

13 **Table 2. Review of recent studies detecting influenza virus in size-resolved particulate matter samplers**

<i>Source</i>	<i>Sampling environment</i>	<i>Sampling location(s)</i>	<i>Particle size distribution of influenza virus reported</i>			<i>Distribution of influenza virus in modified ranges for use with ASHRAE Standard 52.2 (F_0)</i>		
			$<1.7 \mu\text{m}$	$1.7\text{--}4.9 \mu\text{m}$	$>4.9 \mu\text{m}$	$0.3\text{--}1 \mu\text{m}$	$1\text{--}3 \mu\text{m}$	$3\text{--}10 \mu\text{m}$
[51]	Urgent care clinic	Personal indoor	$<1.7 \mu\text{m}$ 32%	$1.7\text{--}4.9 \mu\text{m}$ 16%	$>4.9 \mu\text{m}$ 52%	19%	20%	62%
		Stationary indoor (lower floor)	$<1 \mu\text{m}$ 13%	$1\text{--}4.1 \mu\text{m}$ 37%	$>4.1 \mu\text{m}$ 50%	13%	24%	63%
		Stationary indoor (upper floor)	$<1 \mu\text{m}$ 9%	$1\text{--}4.1 \mu\text{m}$ 27%	$>4.1 \mu\text{m}$ 64%	9%	17%	74%
[52]	Hospital emergency room	Combination of personal and stationary indoor	$<1 \mu\text{m}$ 4%	$1\text{--}4 \mu\text{m}$ 49%	$>4 \mu\text{m}$ 47%	4%	33%	63%
[53]	Cough aerosol collection system	Personal cough airstream	$<1 \mu\text{m}$ 42%	$1\text{--}4 \mu\text{m}$ 23%	$>4 \mu\text{m}$ 35%	42%	15%	43%
[54]	Health center, daycare center, and airplanes	Stationary indoor	$<1 \mu\text{m}$ 36%	$1\text{--}2.5 \mu\text{m}$ 28%	$>2.5 \mu\text{m}$ 36%	36%	37%	27%
[55]	Patient room with breathing manikin	Combination of personal and stationary indoor	$<1 \mu\text{m}$ 19.5%	$1\text{--}4 \mu\text{m}$ 75.5%	$>4 \mu\text{m}$ 5%	20%	50%	30%
Mean viral distribution across all studies						20%	29%	51%
Standard deviation						14%	12%	18%
Relative standard deviation						0.70	0.44	0.36

1 In these recent investigations, the amount of influenza virus content in a range of particle
2 sizes was quantified using a variety of bioaerosol samplers installed in a variety of locations and
3 indoor environments. Sampling environments included healthcare centers, daycare centers,
4 hospital emergency rooms, simulated patient rooms, and in the coughing/breathing zone of both
5 people and manikins. Sampling locations within each environment included both stationary
6 indoor measurements and personal measurements. Importantly, the variety of aerosol samplers
7 used also varied in their particle size cut-off points. However, each study characterized virus
8 content in three generally similar bins: (i) particles smaller than 1 μm , (ii) particles 1 μm to 2.5-
9 4.9 μm , depending on the sampler type, and (iii) particles larger than bin (ii). Influenza virus
10 content varied widely in each of these size bins across each study. For example, the average virus
11 content in the smallest size bin ($< 1 \mu\text{m}$) ranged from 4% in a hospital emergency room to 42%
12 in the immediate vicinity of coughing human subjects. Conversely, the largest size bin contained
13 5-64% of virus content, depending on sampler and environment, although the majority of studies
14 revealed that at least 35% of virus content was associated with the largest size bin.

15 Fortunately for this work, the size bins from the selected studies aligned relatively closely
16 to the three size bins outlined in the most commonly used HVAC filtration standard in the U.S.,
17 ASHRAE Standard 52.2, which classifies filtration efficiency in bins of 0.3-1 μm , 1-3 μm , and
18 3-10 μm [36]. Therefore, we adjusted each of the reported size distributions in Table 2 to fit
19 within those three particle size ranges by assuming that the virus content has a uniform
20 distribution in each particle size bin. These assumed distributions are shown in the rightmost
21 columns in Table 2. Although this assumption introduces some uncertainty, we have no way of
22 directly quantifying the magnitude at this time. We do however explore uncertainty in a later
23 section using both the mean and relative standard deviations of the assumed viral size

1 distributions, as summarized in the bottom of Table 2, which can place likely bounds on risk
2 estimates made using Equation 2.

3 On average across all of these studies, we estimate that approximately 20% of influenza
4 virus content is associated with particles in the 0.3-1 μm size range in these recent studies; 29%
5 is associated with the 1-3 μm size range, and 51% is associated with the 3-10 μm size range. The
6 smallest size range has the highest relative standard deviation from that mean (70%), followed
7 by the middle size range (44%) and the largest size range (36%). At this point, we have reviewed
8 enough background knowledge of the nature of infectious particles emitted during various
9 human activities and the likelihood of those aerosols containing virus content to inform a
10 mechanistic study of droplet nuclei transport and control based on these infectious aerosol
11 characteristics.

12 **3. Methods**

13 This work uses the modified particle-size-resolved version of the Wells-Riley model in
14 Equation 2 to estimate the risk reductions likely achievable by common HVAC filters for a case
15 study of influenza transmission in a hypothetical office building. Estimates of operational costs
16 are also made for both HVAC filtration and an equivalent amount of outdoor air ventilation in a
17 range of climate zones across the U.S. in order to compare the likely costs of both control
18 methods. The next sections describe our methodology for connecting the modified Wells-Riley
19 model to HVAC filtration (i.e., MERV) and estimating operational costs.

20 **3.1 HVAC filtration and the modified Wells-Riley equation**

21 To connect the modified Wells-Riley equation to HVAC filtration, we first linked likely
22 infectious particle removal efficiency with the Minimum Efficiency Reporting Value (MERV)

1 classification from ASHRAE Standard 52.2. A summary of the MERV table from Standard 52.2
 2 is shown in Table 3 along with best estimates of particle filtration efficiency for lower-MERV
 3 filters that have no MERV requirement for certain particle size bins (i.e., MERV 4-11). Average
 4 values across each of the 0.3-1 μm and 1-3 μm size bins were taken from a previous study that
 5 measured the in-situ removal efficiency of lower efficiency filters [56]; these values also align
 6 similarly to other previous studies [57,58].

7 **Table 3. Minimum Efficiency Reporting Values (MERV) for a range of filters**

MERV^a	0.3-1 μm	1-3 μm	3-10 μm
4 ^b	1%	9%	15%
7 ^b	17%	46%	50%
11 ^b	30%	65%	85%
13	70%	90%	90%
14	80%	90%	90%
15	90%	90%	90%
16	95%	95%	95%
HEPA ^c	99.9%	99.9%	99.9%

^aValues for MERV are taken directly from ASHRAE Standard 52.2 unless otherwise noted.

^bValues for 0.3-1 and 1-3 μm for MERV 4-11 are taken from Stephens and Siegel (2012) because MERV does not require efficiency values to be reported for these particle sizes for these filters [56].

^cHEPA = High efficiency particulate air filter

8
 9 Subsequently, the range of infectious particle size distributions for influenza virus from
 10 Table 2 were linked to the filter removal efficiencies in Table 3 by an infectious particle size-
 11 weighting procedure, as shown in Equation 4.

$$\eta_{\text{filter}} = \sum_{i=1}^3 \eta_i F_i \quad (4)$$

12 where η_{filter} = infectious particle size weighted filtration efficiency (-); η_i = size-resolved
 13 particle filtration efficiency for the geometric mean diameter of particle size bin i (from Table 3);
 14 and F_i = the fraction of virus content associated with particle size bin i (from Table 2). Because
 15 there are multiple references for the distribution of influenza virus content in size-fractioned

1 aerosols, we introduced an estimate of uncertainty by assuming the infectious particle size
 2 distributions from each environment in each referenced study were equally likely to be present in
 3 the modeled indoor environment. These distributions for each filter are shown in Table 4, along
 4 with the mean infectious particle removal efficiency for each filter averaged across each study in
 5 Table 2.

6 **Table 4. Infectious-particle-size-weighted filtration efficiency for a range of HVAC filters**

Filter	Infectious droplet nuclei filtration efficiency (η_{filter})							Noti et al. [55]
	Lindsley et al. [51] Personal	Lindsley et al. [51] Lower Stationary	Lindsley et al. [51] Upper Stationary	Blachere et al. [52] Personal and Stationary	Lindsley et al. [53] Cough Airstream	Yang et al. [54] Stationary	Stationary Manikin	
MERV 4	11.2%	11.7%	12.7%	12.5%	8.2%	7.7%	9.3%	10.5%
MERV 7	43.0%	44.8%	46.3%	47.4%	35.5%	36.6%	41.6%	42.2%
MERV 11	70.7%	73.1%	76.6%	76.3%	58.8%	57.7%	64.2%	68.2%
MERV 13	86.2%	87.4%	88.2%	89.2%	81.6%	82.8%	86.1%	85.9%
MERV 14	88.1%	88.7%	89.1%	89.6%	85.8%	86.4%	88.1%	88.0%
MERV 15	90.0%	90.0%	90.0%	90.0%	90.0%	90.0%	90.0%	90.0%
MERV 16	95.0%	95.0%	95.0%	95.0%	95.0%	95.0%	95.0%	95.0%
HEPA	99.9%	99.9%	99.9%	99.9%	99.9%	99.9%	99.9%	99.9%

7
 8 Mean filtration efficiency values for infectious droplet nuclei are estimated to range from
 9 10.5% for MERV 4 filters to 99.9% for HEPA filters. Assumptions across the wide range of
 10 infectious particle size distributions summarized in Table 2 lead to infectious droplet nuclei
 11 removal efficiencies that vary by as much as 19% absolutely (although the range narrows for
 12 higher MERV filters because of high removal efficiencies for all particle size ranges).

13 While

14 Table 4 provides estimates for assumed removal efficiencies for various MERV filters
 15 across the size ranges of concern for infectious droplet nuclei transmission, other important
 16 parameters for determining the impact of filtration on infectious disease risk in indoor
 17 environments include the infectious particle deposition rate and the recirculation rate through the
 18 HVAC system (which is a function of specific building characteristics).

1 **3.2 Infectious particle deposition and the modified Wells-Riley equation**

2 Particle deposition rates ($k_{\text{deposition}}$) are important for removal of indoor aerosols but are
3 highly variable depending on the nature of the indoor environment [59,60]. The original Wells-
4 Riley model neglected particle deposition; however, for the particle sizes considered, it is more
5 appropriate to account for deposition [4,34,35]. For simplicity, we assume constant values of
6 $k_{\text{deposition}}$ based on size-resolved values used in Riley et al. (2002) [33,61]. Using a geometric
7 mean diameter between 0.3 and 1 μm (0.55 μm), between 1 and 3 μm (1.7 μm), and between 3
8 and 10 μm (5.5 μm), deposition rates were estimated as \sim 0.10 per hour, \sim 0.45 per hour, and \sim 3.0
9 per hour, respectively (taken directly from their Figure 3). When combined with the mean
10 infectious particle size distributions from Table 2, these lead to a mean size-weighted estimate of
11 \sim 1.7 per hour for $k_{\text{deposition}}$ for particles containing the influenza virus. Values for $k_{\text{deposition}}$ ranged
12 from \sim 1.0 to \sim 2.3 per hour depending on the range of infectious particle size distributions
13 assumed from Table 2. These values for $k_{\text{deposition}}$ for influenza were kept constant in each model
14 scenario.

15 **3.3 Application to a case study office environment**

16 This section relies on a case study of a particular indoor environment (an office) to
17 demonstrate the likely impacts that HVAC filtration can have on the risk of spreading a
18 particular airborne infectious disease (influenza). The methods used herein are generalizable and
19 repeatable for other environments although the results are limited to assumptions for the
20 hypothetical environment.

21 We considered a hypothetical 500 m^2 office building with 3 m ceilings ($V = 1500 \text{ m}^3$).
22 We assume the office space has 25 occupants, one of which is infected with the influenza virus (I
23 = 1; *susceptibles* = 24). Per ASHRAE Standard 62.1 [62], the minimum outdoor air ventilation

1 rate should be $8.5 \text{ m}^3/\text{hr}$ per person + $1.1 \text{ m}^3/\text{hr}$ per m^2 of floor area, which is equivalent to ~ 760
2 m^3/hr in the assumed space (yielding an air exchange rate (AER)= $0.51/\text{hr}$). Assuming the
3 outdoor air supply fraction of total airflow is 25% [63], the total supply airflow rate is ~ 3000
4 m^3/hr , with $\sim 2300 \text{ m}^3/\text{hr}$ provided as recirculated air. The removal rate due to recirculated air
5 filtration is thus $\sim 1.52 \times \eta_{\text{filter}}$ per hour (where $2300 \text{ m}^3/\text{hr}$ divided by $1500 \text{ m}^3 = 1.52/\text{hour}$;
6 multiply by particle removal efficiency to get $k_{\text{filtration}}$, assuming that $f_{\text{HVAC}} = 1$). In the office we
7 assumed that adult occupants work 8-hour days ($t = 8$ hours) and that all occupants have an
8 average breathing rate (p) of $0.67 \text{ m}^3/\text{hr}$ [64]. We relied on a central estimate of previously
9 published values of quanta generation rate (q) for influenza: $q = 100$ per hour. However we also
10 explore the sensitivity to our modeling results using both upper bounds ($q = 500$ per hour) and
11 lower bounds ($q = 15$ per hour) in the uncertainty analysis.

12 **3.4 Estimating costs of controlling infectious disease with ventilation and filtration**

13 Although outdoor air ventilation rates have been shown to decrease the risk of spreading
14 some infectious airborne diseases, introducing more ventilation air also comes with an energy
15 penalty. Conversely, the introduction of higher efficiency filtration typically increases the
16 pressure drop across the filter, which, in commercial systems with variable air volume fans and
17 airflow controls, will generally increase the amount of energy required to move the same amount
18 of airflow. The next sections describe methods to estimate the annual costs of both outdoor air
19 ventilation and various levels of filtration.

20 **3.4.1 Cost of outdoor air delivery**

21 The amount of energy required to condition excess ventilation air varies according to the
22 magnitude of outdoor airflow rates, climate conditions, and system and equipment efficiency.
23 However, approximate estimates of the amount of energy required to condition the sensible load

1 from outdoor air ventilation can be made using metrics of heating-degree-days (HDD) and
 2 cooling-degree-days (CDD) and by making assumptions about equipment efficiency and system
 3 operational times [65,66]. An approximation of the amount of energy required for heating on an
 4 annual basis was made using Equation 5. This equation assumes that outdoor air ventilation rates
 5 do not vary during operational times.

$$E_{\text{heating}} = \lambda_{\text{ventilation}} V \rho_{\text{air}} C_{\text{p,air}} \text{HDD} \frac{1}{\eta_{\text{heating}}} \alpha \quad (5)$$

6 where E_{heating} = energy required for heating (MJ); ρ_{air} = density of air (1.2 kg/m^3); $C_{\text{p,air}} =$
 7 specific heat capacity of air (1000 J/(kg-K)); HDD = heating degree days during times of
 8 building operation (K-days); η_{heating} = conversion efficiency of heating equipment (-); and $\alpha =$
 9 units conversion factor ($24 \text{ hours/day} \times 10^{-6} \text{ MJ/J}$). Similarly, the amount of energy required for
 10 cooling on an annual basis was approximated using Equation 6 (and utilizing the same
 11 assumptions as Equation 5):

$$E_{\text{cooling}} = \lambda_{\text{ventilation}} V \rho_{\text{air}} C_{\text{p,air}} \text{CDD} \frac{1}{\eta_{\text{cooling}}} \beta \quad (6)$$

12 where E_{cooling} = electricity required for cooling (kWh); η_{cooling} = electric efficiency of
 13 cooling equipment (-); CDD = cooling degree days during times of building operation (K-days);
 14 and β = units conversion factor ($24 \text{ hours/day} \times 0.277 \text{ kWh/MJ} \times 10^{-6} \text{ MJ/J}$). Finally, annual
 15 energy costs were estimated by multiplying average utility rates (assuming these are constant for
 16 simplicity) by the amount of delivered energy required. We assumed that electricity was used for
 17 cooling and natural gas was used for heating.

18 We estimated the cost of outdoor air delivery in the case study office environment for
 19 four different locations across the United States: Chicago, IL, Charlotte, NC, Houston, TX, and
 20 Phoenix, AZ. We assumed that a 90% efficient natural gas boiler or furnace was used for heating

1 and the air-conditioning equipment had a constant electric coefficient of performance (COP) of
 2 3.0 (or approximately SEER 12, which is in line with many relatively new existing commercial
 3 buildings [67]). We assumed that the office building did not operate continuously year-round,
 4 but that it operated ~31% of the time (i.e., 11 hours per day from 7 am to 6 pm to accommodate
 5 staff members, excluding holidays and weekends). We used the defined operational schedule and
 6 hourly TMY3 (typical meteorological year) weather data to calculate HDDs and CDDs for each
 7 hour of assumed operation [68]. HDDs and CDDs were calculated using a base temperature of
 8 18.3°C. Estimates of HDDs and CDDs utilized in the model are shown in Table 5, along with
 9 estimated annual costs of supplying one unit of outdoor ventilation air in each climate. We
 10 assumed electricity rates were constant at \$0.12/kWh and that natural gas rates were \$8/MMBTU
 11 (1 MMBTU = 1055 MJ). These are generally in line with national average rates although we do
 12 not explore geographic variations for simplicity.

13

14 **Table 5. Climate conditions (HDD and CDD) and annual cost of outdoor air delivery used for the office
 15 environment under the assumed operational schedule in each location**

	Chicago	Charlotte	Houston	Phoenix
Heating degree days, HDD (K-day)	893	461	204	159
Cooling degree days, CDD (K-day)	300	415	713	1011
Annual cost of air delivery per unit removal rate (\$ per 1/hr)	\$469	\$367	\$416	\$543

16

17

18 **3.4.2 Cost of HVAC filtration**

19 In commercial environments with variable speed fans, any additional cost of HVAC
 20 filtration can be expressed first in terms of additional fan power required to overcome the
 21 additional pressure drop associated with a higher efficiency (typically higher pressure drop)
 22 filter. This is not necessarily the case in many smaller commercial environments [69], but is a

1 reasonable assumption for this analysis. The additional fan power required to deliver a particular
 2 airflow rate through an HVAC system can be estimated in Equation 7.

$$W_{\text{fan}} = \frac{Q_{\text{filter}} \Delta P_{\text{avg}}}{\eta_{\text{fan}} \eta_{\text{motor}}} \quad (7)$$

3 where W_{fan} = instantaneous power draw required for filtration (W); Q_{filter} = airflow rate
 4 through the HVAC filter (m^3/s); ΔP_{avg} = average pressure drop across filter (Pa); η_{fan} = fan
 5 efficiency (assumed 70% constant as in Bekö et al. 2008); and η_{motor} = motor efficiency (assumed
 6 65% constant as in Bekö et al. 2008 [70]). The total fan energy cost can be estimated using
 7 Equation 8.

$$C_{\text{fan energy}} = W_{\text{fan}} t_{\text{operating}} P_{\text{electricity}} \quad (8)$$

8 where $C_{\text{fan energy}}$ = cost required to overcome filter pressure drop (\$); $t_{\text{operating}}$ = amount of
 9 time that the building is occupied (hours); and $P_{\text{electricity}}$ = electric price (\$/Wh). The fan was
 10 assumed to operate 100% of the time that the building was occupied.

11 To estimate the total cost of filtration, one must also consider the initial cost of the
 12 filtration product itself, the number of filters required for each installation, the typical lifespan of
 13 filtration products, and the labor for filter installation and subsequent disposal at the end of its
 14 useful life [70]. Labor costs were estimated directly from Bekö et al. (2008) as \$12 per filter
 15 installation and \$5 per filter disposal. Assuming each filter is $24'' \times 24''$ ($0.6 \times 0.6 \text{ m}$), the
 16 number of filters required for the office environment was estimated by (i) dividing the airflow
 17 rate through the HVAC filter by an assumed constant 2 m/s face velocity, which yields the
 18 approximate area of filtration required, and (ii) determining the number of $24'' \times 24''$ (61×61
 19 cm) filters to achieve that approximate area, rounding to the nearest whole number. This yielded
 20 one filter required in the hypothetical office environment. Annual labor costs were estimated by
 21 multiplying the labor cost of changing one filter ($\$12 + \$5 = \$17$ per filter) by the estimated

1 number of filter replacements during one year of operation. The initial costs of filtration products
 2 and the typical expected filter life spans were taken from an anonymous contact in the
 3 commercial filtration industry, as shown in Table 6. The AHU fan in the office environment was
 4 assumed to operate 2717 hours per year (or 31%) as described in Section 3.4.1.

5 **Table 6. Assumptions used in estimating the annual costs of HVAC filtration**

Filter	Depth (cm)	Purchase cost	Initial pressure drop (Pa)	Final pressure drop (Pa)	Average pressure drop (Pa)	Expected filter life
MERV 4	5.1	\$2	22	125	73	3 months
MERV 7	5.1	\$4	72	149	111	3 months
MERV 11	5.1	\$7	95	187	141	4 months
MERV 13	5.1	\$11	102	187	144	4 months
MERV 14	30.5	\$50	127	249	188	12 months
MERV 15	30.5	\$90	70	249	159	12 months
MERV 16	30.5	\$125	65	249	157	12 months
HEPA	30.5	\$150	249	498	374	12 months

6

7 4. Results

8 This section first describes results from the infection risk modeling effort, followed by
 9 results from cost estimates and cost comparisons between filtration and outdoor air ventilation.

10 **4.1 Estimates of absolute risk in the case study office environment**

11 Figure 1 shows the predicted risk of infection by the influenza virus during an 8-hour
 12 workday in the hypothetical office building with 25 occupants using a range of HVAC filters
 13 installed in the constant operation HVAC system. The central estimates represent risks predicted
 14 using Equation 2 with a quanta generation rate of 100 per hour and the mean assumption of viral
 15 particle size distributions from Table 2. The error bars represent minimum and maximum risks
 16 predicted according to the range of assumptions for viral particle size distributions in Table 2 and
 17 infectious aerosol removal efficiencies in Table 4 (assuming the same quanta generation rate).




Figure 1. Predicted risk of infection by influenza virus in the hypothetical office environment with various levels of HVAC filtration installed


Using the central estimate for infectious particle size distributions (i.e., the mean from Table 2) and $q = 100$ per hour, 15% of the susceptible occupants (4 out of 24) are estimated to acquire the flu virus from the sole infectious individual if the building is operated without a filter installed. The various assumptions for infectious aerosol size distributions from Table 2 impact estimates of absolute risk in each scenario, although trends across filter scenarios are unaffected. For example, the range of assumptions for size-resolved distributions of virus content in indoor aerosols results in an estimate of the absolute risk of acquiring influenza of between 12% and 21% without a filter installed.

Continuing with the central estimate of infectious particle size distributions, even a relatively low efficiency filter (MERV 7) is predicted to reduce the number of infected individuals by 1 (to 12% risk). Increasing to MERV 13 or higher likely prevents another individual from airborne influenza infection (to 10% or lower risk). Finally, increasing to MERV 16 or HEPA filtration has the same effect of lowering the likely number of infected individuals to 2 (with a ~35-40% reduction relative to no or low filtration efficiency). For MERV 13 and

1 greater, risk reductions are limited not by filtration efficiency but by the amount of airflow
2 recirculating through the HVAC system and filter. Increasing recirculation rates may show
3 stronger impacts of higher efficiency filters; however, these results suggest that MERV 13 can
4 reduce the risk of influenza infection by as many as two individuals in this environment. For
5 reference, one avoided influenza case has been estimated to provide approximately \$375 in
6 economic benefits in the United States [1].

7 **4.2 Estimates of relative risks in the case study office environment**

8 While the infection risk reductions shown in the previous section are absolute, we can
9 also explore trends in risk reductions for each filtration case using a measure of relative risk
10 (RR), as shown in Figure 2. RR values use the “no filter” condition as a baseline; thus, each RR
11 is calculated as the probability of infection with a particular filter installed divided by the
12 probability of infection without a filter installed. The black line shows the RR in the office
13 assuming the mean assumption for infectious aerosol size distributions and a quanta generation
14 rate of 100 per hour. The gray area shows how RR responds to the different assumptions for viral
15 particle size distributions in Table 2.



2 **Figure 2. Relative risk (RR) of influenza infection with each level of HVAC filtration in the hypothetical office
3 environment, assuming $q = 100$ per hour**

4

5 In Figure 2, MERV 4 filters are shown to provide only a 6-7% reduction in risk relative
6 to no filtration. MERV 7 filters are likely to provide a 19-25% reduction in risk ($RR = 0.75-0.81$)
7 and MERV 11 filters are expected to provide 28-35% risk reductions ($RR = 0.65-0.72$). MERV
8 13 and greater levels of filtration are expected to provide between 31% and 47% risk reductions
9 compared to an environment without filtration installed ($RR = 0.53-0.69$). Although not shown
10 here, we also explored the effects of assuming different values of quanta generation rates for the
11 influenza virus (ranging from 15 to 500 per hour). Ranges in assumptions for q greatly impact
12 absolute risks as Equation 2 demonstrates (and more so than assumptions for particle size
13 distributions of viral content), but relative risks remain largely unchanged (although the bounds
14 on uncertainty are higher).

4.3 Cost comparison

The following sections summarize results from the operational cost analysis for both HVAC filtration and outdoor air ventilation.

4.3.1 Costs of filtration

Using the costs and physical properties for filters described in Table 5 in conjunction with the procedure outlined in Section 3.4.2, estimates of the annual costs of filtration were made for each filtration scenario. Results are shown graphically in Figure 3 and in tabular form in Table 7. Total annual costs of filtration are divided into annual fan energy costs, filter purchase costs, and labor costs (which includes the cost of disposal).




Figure 3. Estimated annual cost of filtration in the hypothetical office environment

1

Table 7. Estimated annual cost of filtration in the office environment

Filter	Annual filter product costs	Annual fan energy costs	Annual labor costs	Total annual cost
MERV 4	\$8	\$36	\$68	\$112
MERV 7	\$16	\$55	\$68	\$139
MERV 11	\$21	\$70	\$51	\$142
MERV 13	\$33	\$72	\$51	\$156
MERV 14	\$50	\$93	\$17	\$160
MERV 15	\$90	\$79	\$17	\$186
MERV 16	\$125	\$78	\$17	\$220
HEPA	\$150	\$185	\$17	\$352


2

3 Annual HVAC filtration costs are predicted to range from \$112 for the MERV 4 filter to
 4 \$352 for the HEPA filter installed in the office environment. MERV 7 and 11 filters are
 5 estimated to cost approximately \$140 annually; MERV 13-14 filters are estimated to cost
 6 approximately \$155-160 annually. MERV 15 and 16 filters are estimated to range from \$186 to
 7 \$220 in total annual costs, respectively. Moving from low to high efficiency filters is predicted to
 8 increase the importance of fan energy costs and filter costs and decrease the importance of labor
 9 costs (primarily because of less frequent replacement schedules).

10 **4.3.2 Costs of filtration versus outdoor air ventilation**

11 In order to compare estimates of annual HVAC filtration costs to the annual costs for
 12 delivering outdoor air ventilation, Figure 4 shows annual costs of both filtration and outdoor air
 13 (OA) ventilation normalized by unit removal rate of each scenario. This normalized filtration
 14 cost is the total cost of filtration (i.e., the sum of annual labor, filter, and fan energy costs)
 15 divided by the average estimate of the infectious aerosol removal rate (i.e., the mean infectious
 16 removal efficiency from Table 4 multiplied by the HVAC recirculation rate in the space). This
 17 provides a measure of the cost of each control mechanism relative to its ability to remove
 18 infectious droplet nuclei from indoor air in units of \$ per 1/hr. Figure 4 contains data for both

1 outdoor air ventilation in each of the four U.S. cities described previously and each level of
 2 HVAC filtration operating in the hypothetical office environment (assuming the central estimate
 3 of viral content distributions in indoor aerosols).



4
 5 **Figure 4. Estimates of the total annual cost per unit removal rate (in units of \$ per 1/hour) for outdoor air**
 6 **ventilation rates in each climate and for each level of filtration efficiency in the hypothetical office**
 7 **environment. Filtration costs per removal rate assume the mean infectious aerosol size distribution.**

8
 9 According to Figure 4, MERV 13 and 14 filtration products are estimated to provide the
 10 least expensive removal mechanism in this office environment (in terms of \$USD per 1/hour of
 11 infectious droplet nuclei removal rate). This is attributed to both relatively high effectiveness (as
 12 described in Sections 4.1 and 4.2) and relatively low costs of operation (as shown in Figure 3).
 13 Even HEPA filtration is expected to cost less on an annual basis than outdoor air ventilation in
 14 all climates. MERV 4 is the only filtration product that is more expensive than outdoor air
 15 ventilation according to this metric, primarily because of its very low effectiveness. Although
 16 this approach allows for direct comparison between OA ventilation and HVAC filtration, it does
 17 not provide information about achievable risk reductions in particular environments.

18

1 **4.3.3 Costs of filtration and outdoor air ventilation versus risk reductions**

2 In order to compare costs of operation directly to estimates of risk reductions for both
3 HVAC filtration and OA ventilation, Figure 5 plots the mean predicted relative risk (RR) values
4 from the Wells-Riley modeling (from Figure 2) versus the total cost of providing that same risk
5 reduction with both outdoor air ventilation in each climate and with each level of HVAC
6 filtration. To compare OA ventilation in each location directly to HVAC filtration, OA
7 ventilation rates have been adjusted to achieve the same removal rate as that of each level of
8 HVAC filtration. For example, a MERV 15 filter is expected to achieve 1.37 per hour in
9 infectious droplet nuclei removal in the office environment with the mean assumption for
10 infectious particle size distributions; for outdoor air ventilation to achieve the same risk
11 reduction as filtration, the office HVAC system would need to provide 1.37 additional air
12 changes per hour of outdoor air ventilation. Therefore, OA ventilation and HVAC filtration can
13 be thought of as equivalent in terms of risk reduction (on the y-axis), but will differ in their cost
14 estimates (on the x-axis). For each of the four geographic locations, the cost per unit (\$ per 1/hr)
15 ventilation energy costs from Table 5 was used to estimate the cost of providing this equivalent
16 reduction.




Figure 5. Relative risk (RR) of influenza transmission in the hypothetical office environment with both HVAC filtration and equivalent outdoor air ventilation rates

1

2 **Figure 5. Relative risk (RR) of influenza transmission in the hypothetical office environment with both**
 3 **HVAC filtration and equivalent outdoor air ventilation rates**

4

5 As Figure 5 shows, for each level of risk reduction achievable by the use of every level of
 6 HVAC filtration except MERV 4, filtration is estimated to be less expensive on an annual basis
 7 than equivalent outdoor air ventilation in each of the four climate zones. MERV 13 and MERV
 8 14 filters appear to achieve an optimal combination of lowest risk reductions at least costs.
 9 MERV 4 is actually more expensive to operate than providing equivalent outdoor air ventilation
 10 in each climate, primarily because of the very low effectiveness in controlling infectious
 11 aerosols. HEPA filtration appears to offer only a small incremental advantage over MERV 13-16
 12 filters (i.e., 1-4% lower RR) for as much as 1.6 to 2.3 times the cost of operation, which suggests
 13 that MERV 13-16 filters may be most appropriate for cost-effectively reducing risks of influenza
 14 transmission in this particular indoor environment. In fact, switching from MERV 7 to MERV 13
 15 could likely reduce the number of infected individuals in this office environment by one person
 16 at an additional annual cost of only \$17. Compared to the estimated economic losses of a single
 17 influenza case of \$375, MERV 13 filtration could provide a benefit-to-cost ratio of 20 or more.

1 These basic relationships were not sensitive to the various assumptions for infectious particle
2 size distributions.

3 **5. Discussion**

4 According to the results herein, filtration of recirculated air may be able to reduce the
5 transmission of airborne infectious diseases in this particular indoor environment. Although there
6 is a tremendous amount of uncertainty involved in each step of this modeling effort, the
7 sensitivity of the model to input parameters for both infectious aerosol size distributions and for
8 quanta generation rates was shown to be relatively small for relative risks. The sensitivity to each
9 parameter was larger for absolute risks, with much greater uncertainty associated with
10 assumptions for quanta generation rates.

11 While this case study on a single office environment has been presented for
12 demonstration, more robust statistical techniques could also be used to simulate a wide range of
13 buildings, occupants, and infectious aerosol properties to provide a more generalizable estimate
14 of the likely impacts of filtration across the building stock. Additionally, risk models should be
15 used in conjunction with more detailed hourly building energy balances to more accurately
16 explore the energy impacts of infectious disease filtration relative to control by outdoor air
17 ventilation, which will necessarily vary by climate, human occupancy and activity, and building
18 operational characteristics. Additionally, it is clear that particle size distributions of expelled
19 droplet nuclei should be measured in more standardized ways with much greater numbers of
20 individuals than only those studies identified in the literature review and summarized in Table 2.
21 Last, future epidemiological work should also validate the predictions herein.

1 It should be noted that there are also more physically and biologically grounded models
2 for assessing risks of infectious respiratory diseases, such as dose-response (D-R) models that
3 incorporate mass balances and/or Markov chains that predict infectious particle concentrations,
4 exposures, and doses, the “infectivity” of the particles, and the organism’s susceptibility to
5 disease [29,71,72]. D-R models have been used in recent studies to model infectious disease
6 transmission using more mechanistic properties of both tuberculosis [73] and influenza [39,71];
7 however, D-R models also have their own inherent limitations, including often requiring
8 interspecies extrapolation to estimate susceptibility of a human subject. Regardless, results from
9 the modeling effort herein demonstrate that HVAC filtration can very likely play a role in
10 preventing the transmission of airborne infectious diseases at lower costs than providing an
11 equivalent amount of outdoor air ventilation, as previous studies have typically explored
12 [3,4,6,7].

13 **6. Conclusion**

14 In this work, an existing airborne infectious disease risk model (the Wells-Riley
15 equation) was modified to include removal by recirculating HVAC filters and linked directly to
16 the primary rating metric of ASHRAE Standard 52.2 for filtration products: MERV. Based on a
17 series of assumptions about infectious particle size distributions resulting from human activities
18 in indoor environments, the risk of acquiring the influenza virus from a single infector was
19 modeled in a hypothetical office environment with a particular focus on what levels of risk
20 reductions could be achieved by different levels of HVAC filtration and equivalent outdoor air
21 ventilation, and at what costs of operation. Overall, recirculating HVAC filtration was predicted
22 to achieve the greatest risk reductions at lower costs of operation than equivalent outdoor air

1 ventilation, particularly for MERV 13-16 filters. Medium efficiency filtration products (MERV
2 7-11) are also inexpensive to operate but appear less effective in reducing infectious disease
3 risks.

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